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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner,
v.
RICKIE L. REBER,
TEX WILLIAM ATKINS, &
STEVEN PAUL THUNEHORST,
Case No. 20060299-SC

Respondents.

STATE OF UTAH,
in the interest of:
C.R. ,
A person under 18 years of age,
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the decisions of the
court of appeals in State v. Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 128 P.3d
1211, and In re C.R., 2005 UT App 486 (unpublished).
A & B.1

See addenda

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (a) and § 78-2-2 (5) (West 2004).

1

This appeal represents the consolidation of four cases.
Three cases, each involving a single adult defendant, were
consolidated by the trial court. See Order at addendum C. The
fourth case, adjudicating the juvenile son of one of the adult
defendants, was consolidated upon this Court's own motion in its
order granting certiorari review. See Order at addendum D. The
State's record citations refer to the Reber case materials.
Moreover, for purposes of linguistic flow, the State uses the
singular form, "defendant," throughout its briefing.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The State of Utah may not exert jurisdiction in Indian
Country if either the perpetrator of a charged crime or any
victim is Indian.

This guiding principle gives rise to two

questions for certiorari review.
1.

Does the Ute Indian Tribe have a regulatory interest in

hunting throughout Indian Country, such that the Tribe is a crime
victim of any illegal hunting within Indian Country?
2.

Does the Ute Indian Tribe have a property interest in

wildlife located throughout Indian Country, such that the Tribe
is a crime victim of any illegal hunting within Indian Country?
Jurisdictional rulings are reviewed for correctness.

State

v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, 55, 11 P.3d 709 (citing State Dep't of
Soc. Servs. v. Viiil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)).

Although

this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals on
certiorari, it may review for correctness the legal conclusions
of both the trial court and the court of appeals.

Butterfield v.

Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
18 U.S.C. § 1151, defining "Indian Country" is located at
addendum E.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-3 (West 2004), governing taking or
transporting protected wildlife, provides in pertinent part:
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(1) Except as provided in this title or a
rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife
Board, a person may not:
(a) take. . .
(i) protected wildlife or their parts. . . or
(b) transport . . . protected wildlife or
their parts. . . or
(d) possess protected wildlife . . .
unaccompanied by a valid license, permit,
[or] tag . . .
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without
a valid license, permit, [or] tag . . . is
prima facie evidence that the protected
wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally
held in possession.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-23

(West 2004), governing aiding or

assisting, provides:
It is unlawful for any person to aid or
assist any other person to violate any
provisions of this code or any rules or
regulations promulgated under it. The
penalty for violating this section is the
same as for the provision or regulation for
which aid or assistance is given.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of aiding or assisting
in the wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-4, -23
2004).

(West

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction

(R. 12-13).

After extensive briefing and hearings

on jurisdiction and subsidiary issues related to jurisdiction,
the court denied the motion

(R. 359-64).

Defendant was then

tried by a jury, which convicted him as charged
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(R. 505-06, 5 6 4 ) .

The court ordered a suspended prison term of zero-to-five years,
restitution payable to the Utah Department of Wildlife "Stop
Poaching" Fund in the amount of $4000, a fine of $1250 or 250
hours of community service, and three years of probation with
conditions attached (R. 562-65).
Defendant filed a timely appeal, seeking review of the trial
court's pre-trial rulings (R. 566-67).

The court of appeals

consolidated defendant's appeal with two other appeals raising
identical issues.

See addendum C.

After oral argument, the

court of appeals vacated the convictions of all three defendants,
concluding that "the crimes occurred in Indian Country governed
by the Ute Tribe.

Because the Ute Tribe is the victim, the State

does not have jurisdiction."
addendum A.

Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 1 13 at

When the court of appeals denied the State's

petition for rehearing, the State filed a petition for writ of
certiorari.

Defendant filed a cross-petition.

This Court

granted the petitions as to the two issues raised by the State
and one issue raised by defendant.

The Court further ordered

that a juvenile court case adjudicating the son of one of the
defendants also be consolidated into this case.

See addendum D.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the 2002 deer hunt, a truck pulled up to a checkpoint
in Uintah County where the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources
was checking for chronic wasting disease (R. 584: 157). There
was a large mule deer buck in the truck bed, but no state hunting

-4-

permit, license, or tag attached to the animal (Id. at 158).
Defendant and his son, as well as two other relatives, were in
the truck (Ld^ at 162).
Defendant told a conservation officer that his son had shot
the deer but that he felt responsible for the act (Id. at 164,
167).

The son corroborated that he had killed the deer (Id. at

165).

The conservation officer testified that defendant had

blood on his hands, and defendant's brother testified that
defendant had helped load the deer into the truck (Id. at 165,
180) .2
Based on this evidence, defendant was convicted, as charged,
of aiding or assisting in the wanton destruction of wildlife (R.
2-3, 545-48).3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The crime in this case was committed in Uintah County on
land that is also Indian Country.

Criminal jurisdiction over

crimes committed in Indian Country turns on the Indian or non-

2

These facts document the charge against defendant Reber.
His son, C.R. was charged by petition in juvenile court with
wanton destruction of wildlife. Defendants Thunehorst and Atkins
were each charged with aiding or assisting in the wanton
destruction of wildlife, a class A misdemeanor, for poaching deer
in the National Forest in northwestern Uintah County within
Indian Country (R. 363-64).
3

In contrast to the other adult defendants, Reber was
charged with a third degree felony because the animal was a
trophy deer, statutorily defined as "any buck with an outside
antler measurement of 24 inches or greater." Utah Code Ann. § 2313-2(46) (a) (West 2004). The parties stipulated to the size of
the antler spread (R. 584: 165-66).
-5-

Indian status of the defendant and the victim, if there is one.
The State has jurisdiction only if both the defendant and any
victim are non-Indian.

The court of appeals determined that the

State did not have jurisdiction because the Ute Indian Tribe was
the victim of defendant's unlawful hunting by virtue of its
regulatory interest.

This conclusion is incorrect for two

reasons.
First, the Ute Indian Tribe is not the victim for purposes
of determining criminal jurisdiction because it does not have an
unfettered regulatory interest in all hunting on all land within
"Indian Country."

Its regulatory interest does not encompass

non-Indian hunting on non-Indian lands within Indian Country.
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).

While the crime

in this case was committed in Indian Country, no record evidence
suggests that it was committed on Indian lands, which are lands
owned or held in trust for an Indian tribe or an individual
Indian.

Because the Tribe's regulatory authority does not extend

to non-Indian hunting on non-Indian lands, the tribe lacked
regulatory authority over the hunting in this case.

Lacking such

authority, the Tribe is not the victim and jurisdiction properly
lies with the State.
Second, the Ute Indian Tribe is not a victim by virtue of a
property interest in the wildlife.

The United States Supreme

Court has soundly rejected the concept of ownership of wild
animals, deeming it a legal fiction.

-6-

"Ownership" of wild animals

refers not to any proprietary concept of private ownership b.:t *: •••
the sovereign/s capacity, In t:x ust for the communal benefit c f
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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
.'he parties agree that the land on vTU"i~h ^he crime occurred
was Indian Country.

Under established principles or ire'-

. . : Jii.juLion over crimes committ-u in Indian Cour. = .:y
depends upon the Indian nr v.< -n- r.ndi an status
•:-•••463, 465 n. '/. 1984),
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^ b 0 perpetrator

aartlett, ^cb U

c
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The State has jurisdiction over crimes that

victim of the crime is Indian, then the federa.i
will have jurisdictl --r

:;.•. :: ; ; . :

r tribal courts
, Americai i

Indian Law, 180-81 (41:1:i ed. 2004) (chart at addendum G) ,

:1:

l

Underlying all determinations ui j unsaicuion ror crimes
committed in Indian Country is the nature of the relationship
between the federal government and federally-recognized Indian
- 7-

L

•.

Following extensive pre-trial briefing and argument, the
trial court in this case determined that the State had
jurisdiction because defendant was not Indian (R. 261-65 at
addendum G; R. 360-64 at addendum H) .5

The parties below did not

focus on, nor did the trial court rule on, whether the unlawful
taking of a deer involved a victim.

On appeal, however, the

court of appeals found this issue dispositive.

It determined

that the Ute Tribe was the victim of defendant's illegal hunting

tribes. That is, federal "regulation is rooted in the unique
status of Indians as *a separate people' with their own political
institutions. Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is
governance of once-sovereign political communities." United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). Thus, w u v i n
dealing with Indians the Federal Government is dealing primarily
not with a particular race as such but with members of certain
social-political groups towards which the Federal Government has
assumed special responsibilities."'" LaPier v. McCormick, 986
F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Heath, 509
F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted)).
The federal government assumes these "special
responsibilities" only under specific circumstances. For
example, where either the perpetrator or victim of a crime
committed in Indian Country meets the legal definition of Indian,
the federal interest in the crime and its consequences would
mandate federal jurisdiction and preclude state jurisdiction.
See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1459 (D.S.D.
1988) (citing D. Getches &' C. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 41215 (2d ed. 1986)). The State, in turn, exercises criminal
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian Country only when
Indian interests, which would implicate a federal responsibility,
are absent. See State v. Sorkhabi, 46 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002) (state's jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian
Country by non-Indians in victimless crimes or against nonIndians "is based on the fact that ^such crimes do not involve
essential tribal relations or affect the rights of
Indians'")(citation omitted).
5

Moreover, at sentencing, the court ordered that defendant
pay restitution to the Utah Department of Wildlife Resources
"Stop Poaching Fund" (R. 563).
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and that, a c c o r d i n g l y , the State lacked j u r i s d i c t i o n ,

H a v i n g ...

thus resolved the ji irisdicti onal question,' the court of a p p e a l s
did not address w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t was Indian, leaving u n t o u c h e d
the t r i a l . c o u r t / s d e t e r m i n a t i o n that he was n o t .
POINT ONE
THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE IS NOT A. CRIME ••
V I C T I M FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING
J U R I S D I C T I O N , BECAUSE IT DOES NOT
H A V E AN U N F E T T E R E D R E G U L A T O R Y
INTEREST IN H U N T I N G T H R O U G H O U T
vx
INDIAN C O U N T R Y " ; W H E N , AS H E R E , A
N O N - I N D I A N ILLEGALLY H U N T S ON N O N INDIAN LAND IN "INDIAN C O U N T R Y , "
T H E T R I B E HAS NO REGULATORY
INTEREST A N D , T H E R E F O R E , CANNOT BE
THE CRIME VT^TiM
The court of appedis held that the Ftate lacked

jurisdiction

to p r o s e c u t e defendant for p o a c h i n g b — nr. •-» • '
was trie crime victim.
victim because
o:

— e

The court reasoned chat t..ne Tribe v^as the

1.L had r e g u l a t o r y ^u^hority over all huntir ;

: ,; _:-__•_;:: : ng a n y w h e r e wi.u

regulatory authority.

See State v,

M<- unlawf^' 1 Vi \ ' i^a ^f 3 deer in

Reber, 2005 ' "i" App 485, Hj'l i
1. J

..i-i ..- 'ountry.

; :.;je uy . wterlermg

.

Id, at 11 9- 11.

I J t e T r i b e w a s 1:1: I e " ; :i :: t :i n: t. 1: ;; ,

^iLh its

T1 Ie conc 1 usIon that the
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authority over all of Indian Country is incorrect b e c a u s e i 1:
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fishinq in Indian Country Is i Iot u n f e t t e r e d .

: • = J : 1 Ii 11 I 1:i i I :j a i I• :i

M o r e o v e r , i t is

directly c o n t r a r y to settled United States Si lprerne Coi ir t
precedent.
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A. Indian Country defined and distinguished from Indian
lands, tribal lands, trust lands, and reservation land.
The court of appeals' conclusion that the Ute Indian Tribe
was the victim of defendant's unlawful hunting within Indian
Country misapprehends several legally-significant terms crucial
both to understanding the geographic extent of the Tribe's
regulatory authority and to correctly resolving the
jurisdictional question.

The Reber opinion uses multiple phrases

interchangeably to describe the extent of the Ute Tribe's
regulatory and jurisdictional reach: "Indian Country,"
"reservation land," "tribal lands," and "Indian lands." See
Reber, 2005 UT App 485, M
synonymous.

11-13.

These terms are not

Using them synonymously led the court of appeals to

a conclusion directly contrary to United States Supreme Court
precedent.
"Indian Country," a legal term of art, is an umbrella term,
describing all territory within the exterior, historical
boundaries of a reservation not expressly diminished by an Act of
Congress.

See Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State

Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359 (1962).6

This broad term

references geography, not land ownership, and can include lands
held in a variety of ways.

For example, it can include "tribal"

or "trust" lands, which are those lands owned and held in trust
by the federal government for individual Indians or tribes.
6

The codified definition of Indian Country is found at 18
U.S.C. § 1151, located at addendum E.
-10-

vx
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of Wildlife Resources officer testified that the deer was killed
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"just east of Bitter Creek on the Kings Well Road" in Uintah
County.

See R. 584: 164.

This evidence was undisputed.

Plotting the location on a map demonstrates that the crime was
committed miles away from the nearest Indian lands.

See addendum

F.
B.

Montana v. United States is dispositive.

The court of appeals in Reber held that the State could not
assert jurisdiction because the crime victim was the Ute Indian
Tribe.

2005 UT App 485, 1 13.

The Ute Tribe, however, is not

the victim because the Tribe lacks regulatory authority over nonIndian hunting on non-Indian lands within Indian Country.
The Tribe's regulatory authority over non-Indian hunting on
non-Indian lands within Indian Country is directly addressed in
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).

Indeed, the

United States Supreme Court has characterized Montana as "the
pathmarking case concerning tribal civil authority over
nonmembers/'
(1997).

Strate v, A-l Contractors, 52 0 U.S. 4 38, 445

Montana "concerned the authority of the Crow Tribe to

regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within the
Tribe's reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians.''' Id.
The case is dispositive because it addresses the interests of
both the State and the Tribe in regulating non-Indian hunting in
Indian Country on land that is not owned by the Tribe or a member
of the Tribe or is not held in trust for their benefit by the

-12-

United. States.

Montana conclusively establishes that the U t e

Tribe cannon be the vi ctim.in this case.
Montana, the Crow reservation, whi ch w a s "Indian
Country,, " inc] uded three categories of 1 ind ownership: land hP 1 d
i i i I!:i us t 1: > tl: le federal government i^r ti ,bal m e m b e r s

(Indian ••

l a n d ) ; land held in trust by t.h^ federal government for r^e Tribe
(11 i :I :i an 1 a j i I i , 11 n J 1 \ \ i I In IM in lee b y nun-Indians
land).

(non-Indian •;

Montana, 450 i j. S. at 5 4 8 . The issue presented w a s

whetl ler the Vi if'1

I'UIJM

'...••/

j« ijnii in iiuin i i m | i11l min Indians on the •

non-Indian land within Indian Country, largely the bed and banks
of

t h e R i q H< m 11 P i v« * t ,

!

11 I I M

" n p i •-•mtj

' u i 11 I I n • I < I | v i b b < M I i 111 > >

the ownership of Montana upon its admission to the Union.
556-57.

In other w o r d s ,

.•••IIM

M,.

,rn ,. "in, . |

Id. at

• i M 1. ^ • •» n 'i lndi.ni

hunting on non-Indian, state-owned land within Indian Country?
The Supreme Court held that it cuulu

-'

• * *

Indian sovereignty, various Crow t r e a t i e s , emu : -••.? federal
trespass statute, ] 8 I J.S.C
reg u 1atory ai i 11 iori t y ,

§ 1 ] 65i( as possible sources o\

Id. at 55 7.

4>

' •

11 I 11 Ie lat°r case of Strate

v. A-l C o n t r a c t o r s , 520 U.S. 438 (1997), the Supreme Court •,•,•.:••,.•
s i ii [ n [ La r I z e d i t: s 1 Ic ] :l :i i i• :j :i i I Moi rtai ia :. •

.'"'.

Montana thus described a general rule that,
absent a different congressional direction,
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the
conduct of nonmembers on non-Indian land
within a reservation, subject to two
exceptions: T h e first exception relates to
nonmembers w h o enter consensual relationshi ps
with the tribe or its m e m b e r s ; t h e second
concerns activity that directly affects the
tribe's politd cal i ntegrity, economic
•• •,
-13-

security, health, or welfare. The Montana
Court recognized that the Crow Tribe retained
power to limit or forbid hunting or fishing
by nonmembers on land still owned by or held
in trust for the Tribe (citation omitted).
Id. at 446.7
The Montana rule, that a tribe cannot regulate non-Indian
hunting on non-Indian land within Indian Country, is dispositive
because neither of the exceptions apply in this case.

First,

there is no evidence of a consensual agreement between the nonIndian hunters and the Ute Tribe that would subject such hunters
to tribal regulations governing hunting in Indian Country on nonIndian land.

Second, as in Montana, the facts of Reber do not

suggest that non-Indian hunting on non-Indian land so implicates
the economic security or self-government of the Tribe as to
justify tribal regulation.
To the contrary, here the Ute Indian Tribe filed an amicus
brief in the court of appeals on behalf

of

the State's position,

asking the court to uphold defendant's state court conviction
based on a violation of state law.

The Ute Indian Tribe itself,

consistent with Montana, thus explicitly endorsed the State's
regulation of and criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians hunting
illegally on non-Indian land within Indian Country.

7

The same rule that applies to privately-owned fee lands
and state-owned lands also applies to federally-owned lands. See
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993)
-14-

Under Montana, t h e Ute Tribe has no regulatory authority.'
over non-Indian hi inti ng on 1 and 2 n Indian Country that i s n o t
: r c I J t B t r i 1: a 1 m e m b e r o r :i s n ot 1 Ie 1 d " ° •'"rust
by the United States for the benefit of the Tri be or m e m b e r s of
tl le Tr. LI"H.-1.

I

I L^gn I I

I UI<J

11 i s s u e h e r e w a s c o m m i t t e d

by a non-Indian on land miles away from t h e nearest Indian lands,
11 i e T i :i b e h a s i I : • r • B q i i ] a 1: o r y a I I 11: I o r j t y • :> \ s r t: 1 i a 1: a c 1: :i ;,„ :i 1: ;y a i I :i

;' •. •

canncj-t, therefore, be the crime victim.
r+M... ., ,, ^ ^ w >.„>x ^-^ court of appect
*~~di>, n o t to a l l of Indian Country.

teritrai auti,.
-ii-i-li' only to Inc.

Several central authorities relied upon b y t h e court ~f
aopeals do rv\r support- its d^cisio-

:,,

M

;. i'l^j c o m . , ^t a p p e a l s

<

jj;-;...ii

•:^i^:.

.L.-i.o. r

or example, ' ' equating

erroneously concluded that the Utah Constitution precludes t h e
S t a t e f s e x e r c i s e o f j i i r :i s d i c t i o i I a i I ^ wi I e r e w 11 h I n I nd I a n C c un t r y.
By its plain language, however, article 111 of t h e Utah
C o n s 1: :i 11 11 i :> i l a p p ] :i e s o i I ] ^ !:: • :: ] a i i :I s v" % : \ 11 I • s :i :: r 1 I • s ] d t y a r I ;y 1 n d i a n
or Indian tribes

See Reber, 2005 UI App 485, 15

(quoti ng Utah

!: :i :: ] e 111, 1: y :i t s e : i p ,1 :i c I:: 1: e r i in s ,

Const. Art. u i ) .

11 Ii is

applies to Indian l a n d s , not to all of Indian Country.
Similarly, by equating
the

M

I n d i a n Countx '

c o u r t of a p p e a l s e r r o n e o u s l y r e l i e d ^n ^.i:

to c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d • ^ > ^ur-t ^ a n ^ s .
Fel tier, 54 6 i " Si /;[ j:
1505,

-> -LhH a p p l y o n l y
"nit d St a^es

,r

,

- o _ ' r aff' d 7 52 ?\ 2 i

1507 (10th Cir. 1 ^ . 5 ) ; United States v. V o n Murdock, 919

E ' Si ipp
•".

^ e , e. *

,"

] 53 1
•

1 538

a n - i . :._ i

(
••

-

1

5

-

,i

.

' 1Cth

Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 810 (1998).

These cases, by

their explicit terms, do not control because they offer no
guidance about the State's criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
on non-trust lands.
Specifically, both Felter and Von Murdock addressed charges
brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which governs trespass on
trust land for the purpose of hunting and fishing.
752 F.2d at 1506; Von Murdock, 132 F.3d at 535.

See Felter,

By its explicit

terms, section 1165 applies only to land owned by the federal
government and held in trust for an Indian or Tribe.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 561-62.

See

Indeed, Congress specifically

considered incorporating the broader definition of Indian Country
into section 1165 and then intentionally rejected the idea.

Id.

at 562.
In Felter, the crime was committed "within Indian Country
and upon lands in the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation held in
trust by the United States for the Ute Indian Tribe."
at 1507 (emphasis added).
was committed "upon land

Similarly, in Von Murdock, the crime
belonging

to

held in trust by the United States."
(emphasis in original).

752 F.2d

the

Ute Indian

Tribe

and

919 F. Supp. at 1538

References to tribal lands, trust lands,

Indian lands, and reservation lands in these two cases are thus
limited to land owned by the Tribe and held in trust by the
federal government.

These lands are not coextensive with the

broader geographical designation of Indian Country.

-16-

The Reber opinion, by failing to recognize the distinction
between Indian Country and trust land, cites Felter ,nir|

VMII

Murdock as though the teachings of these cases applied to all nf
Indian Country,

They Hn not.

]:: 'Oi I::i • :>i 1 : f J <E

They apply only to a smaller

I 11 i 11 t. ho broader designation of Indian Country.

They apply to land that is hobi
1

• rr- -t -v •-;

T

- o

.....

a

federal

. ..dian.

For '

example, Reber relies directly cw Felter to assert that "the Ute
=

•

'

*

I a n ; it g o v e r n s . "
statement

:•

"

•'

'

200b UT App 4 ^ , 1!
,

h e

,

Tased on Felter, this
i -.t-j ,

does not stana lor r;he proposition that : ':o Tribe has a
regulatory interest ~-.-Country

i

-; conclusion ihdL :* .j-reculy contrar, to Montana.

Reber also relies on Fel toy

•

*

iirm

uelvjLdanis^ acts ^f hunting >:<n Indian Country affected thf "to
Tribe's regulatory interest, the tribe is the vici
i-.-b-

rei. ^ i , uowever. -» +• ^ n

__._

only be accurately .stated that

if defendants had hunted unlawfully on trust land, the Ute
Tribe's reguh-il " u:•> inL<-j.iost in hunting would have been affected.
Felter does ;i ;v, support the more far-reaching proposition,
r ' •--

1 i t : f Moi it a. i la, tl la I:

iny where

Indian Country affects the Tribe's regulatory interests.
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POINT TWO
THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE DOES NOT HAVE
A TRADITIONAL PROPERTY INTEREST IN
WILDLIFE ON THE HOOF; LACKING SUCH
AN INTEREST, THE TRIBE IS NOT THE
VICTIM OF DEFENDANT'S UNLAWFUL
POACHING
After concluding that the Ute Tribe was the crime victim by
virtue of its regulatory interest over all hunting in Indian
Country, the court of appeals observed in a footnote that "[a]n
argument might also be made that the Ute Tribe had a property
interest in the wildlife."

Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 111 n.3.

This footnote suggests that the Ute Indian Tribe may be a victim
for purposes of determining criminal jurisdiction because a deer
killed anywhere in Indian Country invokes a tribal property
interest in the wildlife.

Id.

This proposition is incorrect.

The United States Supreme Court has made clear on multiple
occasions that living, wild animals are not subject to ownership,
in the sense of bestowing property rights on the party whose land
a freely-roaming animal happens to occupy at any given time.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has branded the idea of owning wild
animals as "pure fantasy":
A State does not stand in the same position
as the owner of a private game preserve and
it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild
fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States
nor the Federal Government, any more than a
hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to
these creatures until they are reduced to
possession by skillful capture. . . . The
"ownership" language [of cases cited by
appellant] must be understood as no more than
a 19th century legal fiction expressing "the
-18-

importance to its people that a State have
power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource."
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)
(quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)); accord
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979); see also Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1896)(overruled on other
grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra)(reviewing nature of
property in "animals ferae naturae" and concluding they are not
private property but rather communal assets whose control and
regulation are exercised "as a trust for the benefit of the
people"); Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir.
1988)("The federal government does not ^own' the wild animals it
protects"); Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 799 F.2d
1423, 1426 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Neither state nor federal authority
over wildlife is premised upon any technical "ownership" of
wildlife by the government").
The "legal fiction" of ownership of wild animals applies
with equal force to Indian tribes:
The fact that fish and game are presently
upon an Indian reservation does not negate
the state interest in conserving them, along
with all other fish and game within the
boundaries of the state. A tribe cannot
claim to "own" the fish and game on the
reservation so as to deprive the state of any
interest in them.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona Dep't. of Game & Fish, 64 9
F.2d 1274, 1283 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. at 284)).
-19-

Because neither a state, nor

the Federal Government, nor an Indian tribe has a property
interest in wildlife on the hoof, none of these entities can be
considered a victim of a hunting crime committed in Indian
Country.
In suggesting that the Tribe enjoys a property right in
wildlife on the hoof, the court of appeals cites sections of the
Ute Law and Order Code and the Utah Code, both of which purport
to establish wildlife as the property of the respective
governmental entities.

See Reber, 2005 UT App 485, Sill n.3

(quoting Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); Utah Code Ann. § 2313-3 (West 2004)).

The quoted language, however, must be

interpreted to comport with the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court.

To this end, the language in both the tribal and

state codes "must be understood as no more than . . . expressing
the importance to its people that a State [or Tribe] have power
to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource/7

Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. at 284.

Regulation and control of the taking of wild animals thus becomes
a function of the sovereign's police power, a way of maintaining
the resource for the benefit of all the people.

Id.

Such

regulatory authority over wildlife for the communal good does not
equate with classifying wildlife as state-owned or tribal-owned
property that can be bought and sold like any other property.
Because the Tribe does not have a property interest in
wildlife on the hoof, it cannot be the victim of defendant's

-20-

illegal poaching.

The jurisdictional analysis, therefore,

necessarily reverts to a determination of whether defendant is
Indian.

Where, in this case, the trial court determined that

defendant was not Indian and the court of appeals did not disturb
that ruling, jurisdiction properly rests with the State.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the court
of appeals' ruling that the State lacked jurisdiction because the
Ute Indian Tribe was the victim of defendant's illegal hunting on
non-Indian land within Indian Country.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/\j_ day of September, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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[2] Indians 209 €=^32.8
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Rickie L. REBER, Steven Paul Thunehorst, and
Tex William Atkins, Defendants and Appellants.
Ute Indian Tribe, Amicus Curiae.
No. 20040371-CA.
Nov. 10, 2005.
Rehearing Denied March 1, 2006.

Background: Defendant was convicted in a jury
trial in the Eighth District, Vernal Department, A.
Lynn Payne, J., of aiding or assisting in wanton
destruction of protected wildlife, and two other
defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to
attempted wanton destruction of protected wildlife.
Defendants appealed.

209 Indians
209k32.5 Hunting, Fishing, and Similar Rights
209k32.8 k. Violation; Enforcement. Most
Cited Cases
Indians 209 €=^38(2)
209 Indians
209k38 Criminal Prosecutions
209k38(2) k. Jurisdiction. Most Cited Cases
State lacked jurisdiction over defendants charged
with aiding or assisting in wanton destruction of
protected wildlife and attempted wanton destruction
of protected wildlife, as victim was Indian tribe;
defendants shot deer in Indian Country governed by
tribe, and tribe had regulatory interest over hunting
and fishing on land it governed. 18 U.S.C.A. §§
1151,1165.
[3] Indians 209 €=>38(2)

2HoIding: The Court of Appeals, Bench, Associate
P.J., held that state court lacked jurisdiction over
hunting violations committed on Indian lands.

Vacated.
West Headnotes
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=>H34(3)
110 Criminal Law
110XXIV Review
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General
110k 1134 Scope and Extent in General
110k 1134(3) k. Questions Considered
in General. Most Cited Cases
Jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewed for
correctness, and appellate court accords no
particular deference to the district court's decision.

209 Indians
209k38 Criminal Prosecutions
209k38(2) k. Jurisdiction. Most Cited Cases
If either the defendant or the victim is an Indian,
then jurisdiction in a criminal case lies with the
tribal or federal courts.
[4] Indians 209 €==>32.6
209 Indians
209k32.5 Hunting, Fishing, and Similar Rights
209k32.6 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Indians 209 €==>32.10(1)
209 Indians
209k32.5 Hunting, Fishing, and Similar Rights
209k32.10 Fishing Rights
209k32.10(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
The right to hunt and fish on reservation land is a
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long-established tribal right; additionally, aside
from the right to hunt or fish on tribal lands to the
exclusion of others, the tribe possesses the
discretion inherent in the police power to regulate
and allocate the fish and game resources as it sees
fit, within the constraints imposed by law.
*1212 Michael L. Humiston, Heber City, for
Appellants.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen. and Joanne C.
Slotnik, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
Appellee.
Kimberly D. Washburn, Draper, Tod J. Smith,
Boulder, Colorado, and Charles L. Kaiser, Charles
A. Breer, and Peter J. Hack, Davis, Graham &
Stubbs, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae.

with class A misdemeanors. See id. § 23-20-4(3)(b)
1[ 3 Reber filed a motion to dismiss his case for
lack of jurisdiction, claiming that he is an Indian
and was hunting in Indian Country. Atkins and
Thunehorst stipulated with the State that the district
court's ruling on jurisdiction in Reber's case would
apply to their respective cases. The district court
denied Reber's motion, and the jury convicted him.
Atkins and Thunehorst entered conditional pleas to
class B misdemeanors. Defendants separately
appealed, and the Atkins and Thunehorst* 1213
appeals were consolidated with the Reber appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

mi

Before BENCH, Associate P.J., DAVIS, and ORME
,JJ.
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge:
% 1 Defendant Reber appeals his conviction for
one count of aiding or assisting in wanton
destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree
felony in violation of Utah Code sections 23-20-4
and -23. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-20-4, -23
(2003 & Supp.2005). Defendants Thunehorst and
Atkins appeal their conditional pleas of attempted
wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a class B
misdemeanor. See id. We vacate each conviction
for lack of state jurisdiction.

[1] | 4 Defendants assert that the State lacked
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness, and we accord no
particular deference to the district court's decision.
See Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah
Ct.App.1995).

BACKGROUND

ANALYSIS

f 2 During the 2002 deer hunting season in Uintah
County, Reber's son shot and killed a large mule
deer with Reber's assistance. Later, Reber drove
his truck through a Utah Division of Wildlife
Resources checkpoint with the trophy buck in the
bed of the truck. They did not have a state permit,
license, or tag attached to the animal. The State
charged Reber with aiding and assisting in the
wanton destruction of wildlife. Because Reber's
son shot a trophy buck, the crime constituted a third
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4(3)(a)
. During that same hunting season, Defendant
Atkins shot a buck in Uintah County and Defendant
Thunehorst assisted him. They were both charged

f 5 Defendants claim that the State lacked
jurisdiction because they are Indians who exercised
federally protected rights on Indian land. The Utah
Constitution provides:
The people inhabiting this State do affirm and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title
to the unappropriated public lands lying within the
boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying within said
limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes,
and that until the title thereto shall have been
extinguished by the United States, the same shall be
and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of

© 2006 Thomson/West. No

FN1. Defendants raise and address other
issues not covered in this opinion.
Because we conclude that the State did not
have jurisdiction, we need not address the
other issues.

to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Addendum B

Page 3

128 P.3d 1211
128 P.3d 1211, 2005 UT App 485, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 67
(Cite as: 128 P.3d 1211)
the United States.
Utah Const, art. III. Therefore, the federal
government has jurisdiction over Indian lands until
the Congress of the United States relinquishes such
right. See id.
f 6 The State of Utah may assert "jurisdiction over
Indians and Indian territory, country, and lands or
any portion thereof within this state in accordance
with the consent of the United States given by the
Act of Congress of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 78-80
(Public Law 284, 90th Congress), to the extent
authorized by that act and this chapter." Utah Code
Ann. § 9-9-201 (2003). Utah Code section 9-9-213
provides for concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction over hunting on reservations. See Utah
Code Ann. §9-9-213 (2003). In order for section
9-9-213 to apply, and thus allow the State to assert
jurisdiction, certain preliminary requirements must
be met. Pursuant to Utah Code section 9-9-202,
[s]tate jurisdiction acquired or retroceded pursuant
to this chapter with respect to criminal offenses or
civil causes of action shall be applicable in Indian
country only where the enrolled Indians residing
within the affected area of the Indian country accept
state jurisdiction or request its retrocession by a
majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special
election held for that purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 9-9-202 (2003). The court in
United States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1508 n. 7
(10th Cir.1985), noted that "[u]nder current law,
Indian tribes must consent to any state assumption
of jurisdiction over 'Indian Country.' Although
Utah since has indicated its willingness to assume
this jurisdiction, no Indian tribe has accepted its
offer." Id. There is no evidence in the record that
the Ute Tribe has held an election accepting state
jurisdiction. Thus, section 9-9-213, granting
concurrent jurisdiction over hunting, cannot apply.
[2] [3] \ 1 Both parties agree that the crimes in this
case, hunting without a state license, occurred in "
Indian Country." "Under 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the
Tribe and the federal government have civil and
criminal jurisdiction over 'Indian Country.' " Ute
Indian Tribe v. Utah 114 F.3d 1513, 1529 (10th
Cir.1997) {Ute Tribe V ). Without the election

mentioned above, "state jurisdiction over crimes
committed in Indian Country is limited to criminal
acts committed 'by non-Indians against non-Indians
... and victimless crimes by non-Indians.' " State v.
Valdez, 2003 UT App 60,t 4, 65 P.3d 1191
(alteration in original) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 465 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1161, 79 L.Ed.2d
443 (1984)). If either the defendant or the victim is
an Indian, then jurisdiction lies with the tribal or
federal courts. See Valdez, 2003 UT App 60 at %
4, 65 P.3d 1191. Because we hold that the victim in
this case is the Ute Indian Tribe, we need not
address whether Defendants are Indians. See id.
f 8 "The current Uintah and Ouray Reservation is
formed from portions of two prior *1214
reservations, the Uintah Valley Reservation, which
was originally inhabited by the Uintah and
Whiteriver Bands of Ute Indians, and the
Uncompahgre Reservation, which was originally
inhabited by the Uncompahgre Band." United
States v. Von Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th
Cir.1997). "In 1937, ... the three Bands joined
together to form the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah
and Ouray Reservation, and adopted a constitution
and bylaws." Id. (footnote omitted). In 1950,
representatives from each of the Bands "signed a
series of five tribal resolutions which completed the
transition, which began with the constitution, from
loosely-knit Bands to [the] unified Ute Tribe."
Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1461 (10th
Cir.1994). The constitution specified that the
separate Bands ceased to exist outside the Ute
Tribe, and the Ute Tribe maintained jurisdiction
over the reservation areas and the hunting and
fishing rights.™2 See Von Murdoch 132 F.3d at
541.
FN2. The original reservation "was created
by executive order and approved by an act
of Congress." Timpanogos Tribe v.
Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1202 (10th
Cir.2002) (footnote omitted). The act set
apart the Uintah Valley for "the permanent
settlement and exclusive occupancy of
Utah Indian tribes [and] recognized and
guaranteed the Indian rights of the tribes
who settled there." Id. Those rights

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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include the right to hunt. See id. (" 'As a
general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty
rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to
them ....' " (citation omitted)).
f 9 The State asserts that it was the victim in this
case, and because the State is not an Indian, state
courts have jurisdiction over the offense. The
State, however, is not the victim. The State
concedes in its brief that the crime took place "in
Uintah County on land that was within the original
boundaries of the Uncompahgre Reservation and is '
Indian Country.' " There were disputes as to
whether the 1894 and 1897 Acts of Congress
disestablished the Uncompahgre Reservation. See
Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 113 F.2d 1087, 1090-93
(10th Cir.1985) (Ute Indian Tribe III ). In Ute
Indian Tribe III, however, the court held that the
acts did not "disturb the ownership of the land by
the tribal group." Id at 1092. The original
Uncompahgre Reservation is therefore considered
Indian Country, which falls under the Ute Tribe's
civil and criminal jurisdiction. See Ute Indian
Tribe V, 114 F.3d at 1530 (confirming Ute Indian
Tribe III that the tribe and federal government
retained jurisdiction over the Uncompahgre
Reservation). Thus, Defendants shot the deer in
Indian Country governed by the Ute Tribe.
f 10 Alternatively, the State asserts that the crime
is victimless. A victimless crime is a "[t]erm
applied to a crime which generally involves only the
criminal, and which has no direct victim, as in the
crime of illegal possession of drugs." Black's Law
Dictionary 1085 (6th ed.1991). For purposes of
Indian law, it has been emphasized that victimless
crimes must be "truly victimless." William C.
Canby, Jr., American Indian Law 166 (3d ed.1998).
"Crimes against Indian property interests are not
victimless even though no Indian person is directly
assaulted; Indian interests are affected and that fact
places the crime within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal government." Id.
[4] f 11 "The right to hunt and fish on reservation
land is a long-established tribal right." United
States v. Felter, 752 F.2d 1505, 1509 (10th
Cir.1985). Additionally, " '[a]side from the right
to hunt or fish on tribal lands to the exclusion of

others, the tribe possesses the discretion inherent in
the police power to regulate and allocate the fish
and game resources as it sees fit, within the
constraints imposed by law.' " Id. at 1511 (quoting
United States v. Felter, 546 F.Supp. 1002, 1023
(D.Utah 1982)). Thus, the Ute Tribe has a
regulatory interest over hunting and fishing on the
land it governs. Because Defendants' acts of
hunting on Indian Country affected the Ute Tribe's
regulatory interest, the tribe is the victim.™3

FN3. An argument might also be made that
the Ute Tribe had a property interest in the
wildlife. In United States v. Von Murdoch,
132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir.1997), the court
stated that " '[t]ribal rights in property are
owned by the tribal entity, ... including
hunting and fishing rights.' " Id. at 538
(quoting United States v. Felter, 546
F.Supp. 1002, 1021 (D.Utah 1982)). In
Utah Code section 9-9-211, our legislature
recognized a property right, noting that
when a person goes on an Indian
reservation and participates in hunting
without proper authority then all "game ...
in the defendant's possession shall be
forfeited to the tribe." Utah Code Ann. §
9-9-211 (2003). Similarly, pursuant to its
jurisdiction over the land, the Ute Tribe
claims a property interest in the wildlife.
Section 8-1-3(1) of the Ute Law and Order
Code states:
All wildlife now or hereafter within the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation, not held by
private ownership legally acquired, and
which for purposes of this Code shall
include all big game animals ... are hereby
declared to be the property of the Ute
Indian Tribe.
Ute Law and Order Code § 8-1-3(1); cf.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-3 (2003) ( "All
wildlife existing within this state, not held
by ownership and legally acquired, is the
property of the state.").
*1215 f 12 In holding that the defendant in Von
Murdoch, was not an Indian, the 10th Circuit court
asserted jurisdiction and affirmed the conviction for
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128 P.3d 1211
128 P.3d 1211, 2005 UT App 485, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 67
(Cite as: 128 P.3d 1211)
violating 18 U.S.C. § 1165, which prohibits hunting
on land belonging to an Indian tribe without
permission. See Von Murdoch, 132 F.3d 534 (10th
Cir.1997). Likewise, in Felter, the court found that
because the defendant no longer maintained Indian
status, the federal court could assert jurisdiction
rather than the tribal court. See Felter, 752 F.2d
1505. The Felter court noted "that 18 U.S.C. §
1165 is not applicable to tribal members who
hunted in violation of tribal regulation. Tribal
jurisdiction over such minor offenses remains
exclusive." Id. at 1512 n. 11 (quoting Felter, 546
F.Supp. at 1026). It remains clear, however, that "
Indian tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish
non-Indians for criminal offenses, and [thus,] 18
U.S.C. § 1165 was designed to fill the gap in
enforcement powers as to non-Indians hunting or
fishing on tribal or other Indians lands without
tribal permission." Id. The Felter court thus
reasoned that an Indian hunting on Indian lands is
under tribal jurisdiction, but a non-Indian hunting
on Indian lands is under federal jurisdiction.
Nothing in Von Murdoch or Felter suggests that
state courts can ever assert jurisdiction over hunting
violations committed on Indian lands.

CONCLUSION
^ 13 We conclude that the crimes occurred in
Indian Country governed by the Ute Tribe.
Because the Ute Tribe is the victim, the State does
not have jurisdiction. We therefore vacate the
convictions.
f 14 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and
GREGORY K. ORME, Judges.
UtahApp.,2005.
State v. Reber
128 P.3d 1211, 2005 UT App 485, 538 Utah Adv.
Rep. 67
END OF DOCUMENT
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 3006778 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 486
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d)

section 23-20-4 when committed in "Indian Country.
" See id
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, in the interest of C.R., a person
under eighteen years of age.
C.R., Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Appellee.
No. 20040281-CA.

As in Reber, we vacate the judgment in this case for
lack of jurisdiction.
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge,
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
Utah App.,2005.
State ex rel. C.R.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 3006778 (Utah
App.), 2005 UT App 486

Nov. 10, 2005.
END OF DOCUMENT
Eighth District Juvenile, Vernal Department,
170075. The Honorable Larry A. Steele.
Michael L. Humiston, Heber City, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and ORME.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
BENCH, Presiding J.
*1 Appellant C.R. appeals a juvenile court
judgment of wanton destruction of protected
wildlife, a third degree felony if committed by an
adult, in violation of Utah Code section 23-20-4. See
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (Supp.2005). Among
other issues, C .R. asserts that the State did not have
jurisdiction over this case because he was hunting in
Indian Country. "Whether the juvenile court had
jurisdiction is a question of law which we review
under a correction of error standard." Department
of Human Servs. v. B.R., 2002 UT App 25,1f 6, 42
P.3d 390 (quotations and citations omitted).
The facts of this case are, in all relevant respects,
identical to the facts in State v. Reber, 2005 UT
App 485. In that case, this court held that the State
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute a violation of
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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"ATTORWEY GENERAL
AUS 2 3 2004

APPEALS

FILED
IN THB UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

—Ooono—

UTAH APPELLATE L.( v JRTC»

AUG 2 n ?m#

i t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER OF
CONSOLIDATION
Case No. 20040371-CA

v.
Rickie L. Reber
Defendant.and Appellant
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20040464-CA
Case No. 20040644-CA

v.
Steven .fam.
Detendant and Appellant.
State of Utah,
Case No. 20040465-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tex William Atkins,
Defendant and MTmni i^iu.

This matter is before the court on Appellants1 motion to
consolidate appeals pursuant to Rule 3 (b) of the Utah ftules of
Appellate Procedure. The State of Utah does not oppose
consolidation. Each of the above-captioned criminal appeals
originating in the Eighth District Court, Vernal Department,
raises identical issues. The parties stipulated in the district
court that the jurisdictional ruling in State v. Reber, Eighth
District Court No. 021800320, would be binding in each case, and
the court resolved jurisdiction as to each case in its Modified

Findings of Pact and Conclusions o± Law entered on January 29,
2004. On the basis of the foregoing, the court agrees that
consolidation of State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA," "sta£ejy\.
Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA," Statej^. ^
Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No. 20040644-CA is
appropriate. Our consolidation order includes the duplicate
appeals for Atkins and Thunehorst, which were opened following
the entry of signed judgment and order on July 30, 2004, and the
filing of a second notice of appeal in each case on August 2,
2004.
The motion to consolidate appeals also seeks consolidation
with State v. C.R.. Case No. 20040281-CA, a juvenile appeal
related factually to State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA.
Although the juvenile appeal has issues in common with the above
criminal appeals, resolution of the common issues will not
necessarily be dispositive of the juvenile appeal due to the
existence of additional issues raised only by the juvenile
appeal. We decline to include this appeal in the formal
consolidation, but will consider the relationship of the appeals
in calendaring and disposition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate appeals
is granted, in part, and State v. Reber, Case No. 20040371-CA,
State v. Atkins, Case No. 20040465-CA and Case No. 20040645-CA,
and State v Thunehorst, Case No. 20040464-CA and Case No.
20040644-CA are consolidated for all purposes. All future
filings shall be in Case No. 20040371-CA.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the" motion to consolidate appeals
is denied, only insofar as it seeks consolidation of Sftate v\_
C.R., Case No. 2D040281-CA with the above-captioned appeals.
Dated this
FOR THE COURT;

Judi(di M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

day of August, 2004.
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FILED
UTAH APPPLLATPC ucm
SRTO
UUM
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.-.-^.....-JENrdHffl--SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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JUL 2 8 2006
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APPEALS
-a-be 'of""OtratrpPetitioner,
v.

Case No. 20060299-SC
20040371-CA

Rickie L. Reber,
Tex William Atkins, and
Steven Paul Thunehorst,
Respondents.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
certiorari, filed on March 31, 2006 and Cross-Petition for Writ
of Certiorari filed on May 30, 2006.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues:

1. Whether the Ute Indian Tribe has a regulatory interest
and authority over hunting on all the territory within "Indian
Country" in Uintah County and, if so, whether that interest and
authority renders it a crime victim of illegal hunting within
Indian Country.
2. Whether the Ute Indian Tribe has a property interest in
wildlife in Indian Country within Uintah County and, if so,
whether that interest renders it a crime victim of illegal
hunting within Indian Country.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Cross-Petition for Writ of
Certiorari is granted as to the following issue:
Whether the Uintah Band maintains an existence independent
of the Ute Tribe, such that the Band retains treaty rights to
hunt and fish within Indian Country; and whether Cross-

Petitioners demonstrated they are members of the Uintah Band
benefitting from any rights held by that Band.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED upon the court's own motion the
petitions in Supreme Court Case No. 20060299-SC and Supreme Court
Case No. 20060304-SC are consolidated into Supreme Court Case No.
20060299-SC. All future filings shall be filed under Supreme
Court Case No. 20060299-SC
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.

For The Court:

Dated

I hereby certify that on July 28, 2006, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
JOANNE C SLOTNIK
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
KIMBERLY D WASHBURN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
405 E 12450 S STE A
PO BOX 1432
DRAPER UT 84020
MICHAEL L HUMISTON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
23 W CENTER ST
PO BOX 486
HEBER CITY UT 80432
TOD J SMITH
WHITEING AND SMITH
113 6 PEARL ST STE 2 03
BOULDER CO 803 02
CHARLES L. KAISER
CHARLES A. BREER
PETER J HACK
DAVIS GRAHAM & STUBBS LLP
1550 SEVENTEENTH ST STE 500
DENVER CO 802 02
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-023 0
EIGHTH DISTRICT, VERNAL DEPT
ATTN: CANDACE / CHERYL
920 E HWY 40
VERNAL UT 84078

Dep/u/ty C l e r k
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LII / Legal Information Institute

U.S. Code collection
Prev I Next

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 53 > § 1151

§ 1151. Indian country defined
How Current is This?
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country", as used in this chapter, means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether
within or without the limits of a state, and

Search
this title:
Notes
Updates
Parallel
authorities
(CFR)
Your
comments

(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.

Prey | Next
LII has no control over and does not endorse any external Internet
site that contains links to or references LII.
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Addendum G

4. CHAET OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
IN INDIAN COUNTRY BY PARTIES
AND CRIMES
Notes:
i. This chart does not reflect federal crimes
applicable to all persons in all places, such as
theft from the mails or treason.
ii. This chart does not apply to Indian countryover whicl} the state has taken jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280,18 U.S.CA § 1162.

Crime by Parties
a. Crimes by Indians
against Indians:
i. "Major" crimes.
ii. Other crimes.
b. Crimes by Indians
against non-Indians:
i. "Major" crimes,
ii. Other crimes.
c. Crimes by Indians without Victims:
d. Crimes by non-Indians
against Indians:
e. Crimes by non-Indians
against non-Indians:
f. Crimes by non-Indians
without Victims:

Jurisdiction

Federal or tribal
(concurrent)
Tribal (exclusive)

Statutory
Authority

18 U.S.CA § 1153

Federal or tribal
(concurrent)
Federal or tribal
(concurrent)

18 U.S.CA § 1152

Tribal (exclusive)
Federal (exclusive)

18 U.S.CA § 1152

State (exclusive)
State (exclusive)

18 U.S.CA § 1153

Addendum H

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
T

STATE OF UTAH,

T

RLED

~ U~L I~N G
~
R

DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

Plaintiff,

SEP 0 9 2303

vs.

BY

JOANNE MJbKEE, CLERK
VW
DEPUTY

Case No.: 021800320

RICKIE L. REBER,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on June 3, 2003 for hearing. At the hearing the
parties stipulated that:
1. The Defendant's mother carried 1/8 "Indian Blood", and was named on the
Termination Proclamation in 1961.l
2. The Defendant's father does not have any "Indian Blood".
3. The Defendant is 15/16 non-Indian by blood and 1/16 Indian by blood.
4. The Defendant is not a member of any Indian Tribe recognized as a Tribe by
the United States Government.
5. The Defendant is 51 years old. He was born in Roosevelt and lived in
Lapoint, Utah until he was 22. He has not lived in Indian Country since he was 22.
6. The Defendant does not now claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos
Tribe".

7. The Defendant does not maintain that the permit which he produced when he

1

In 1954 Congress passed the Ute Termination Act, August 27, 1954, Ch 1009, 68 State
868, which is now found at 25 U S C 677 "The Termination Proclamation, contemplated by
Section 23 of the "Act", 25 U S C Section 677v , was issued and published by the Secretary
effective at midnight August 27, 1961 26 Fed Reg 8042 " Affiliated Utes v United States 406
US 128 at p 139. see also United States v Felter. 546 F Supp 1002 (Utah DC 1982), at page
p 1006
1

was first contacted by law enforcement is valid. He does maintain that, at that time, he
believed that the permit was valid.
This Court is bound by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perank. 858
P.2d 927 and Hagen v. Utah3 510 U.S. 399. Each of these cases held that the exterior
boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation has been diminished and that there is no outer
boundary to the reservation. The United States Supreme Court noted: "The operative
language of the 1902 Act provided for allocations of reservation land to Indians, and that all
the unallotted lands within said reservation shall be restored to the public domain", (At
412).. ."It follows that wh&n lands so reserved were 'restored' to the public domain •• - i.e.,
once again opened to sale or settlement- - their previous public use was extinguished" (at 412).
The Court then noted that when lands were returned to public domain, this stripped the land of
reservation status (at p412). Finally the Court indicated that "our cases considering operative
language of restoration have uniformly equated it with a congressional purpose to terminate
reservation status." (at p. 413). Finally the Court held: "In light of our precedents, we hold
that the restoration of unallotted reservation lands to the public domain evidences a
congressional intent with respect to those lands inconsistent with the continuation of
reservation status."
Federal law defines Indian Country to include land within: Indian Reservations,
dependent Indian Communities, and Indian Allotments. 18 U.S.C. 1151 (a), (b),(c). Federal
case law also reserves jurisdiction of crimes which occur within "Indian Country" involving an
Indian as a victim to the tribes or the Federal Government. 18 U.S.C. 1152; Duro v. Reina.
495 U.S. 676. However, State Courts have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes which occur
within Indian Country where the defendant and victim are not Indian. Williams v. U.S.. 327
U.S. 711; State v. Roedl. 155 P.2d 741 (Utah 1945). Federal Statutes do not define "Indian"
for criminal jurisdictional purposes. In United States v. Rogers. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 57273 (1846), the United States Supreme Court suggested two factors to be evaluated in
determining who is an Indian: (1) Whether die individual has a significant degree of Indian
blood; and (2) Whether the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a tribe, or society
of Indians, or by the Federal Government. The Rogers test for determining Indian status has
been adopted by the Utah Appellate and Supreme Courts. State of Utah v. Hagen. 802 P2d
745, 748 (Ut. App. Ct. 1990); State of Utah v. Perank. 858 P.2d 927; 932 (Ut. S. CT.,
1992). Until the Utah Supreme Court announces a new standard, this Court is bound by the
Hagen

2

and Perank cases. Therefore, this Court will follow the Rogers test in determining whether
the Defendant is an Indian. Any argument that Utah should follow the test announced in
Lapier vs. McCormicL 986 F.2d 303 should be addressed to the Supreme Court.2
Federal statutes do not address the issue of who has the burden to prove that a
defendant (or victim) is an Indian or that the crime occurred in tfIndian Country". The Utah
Appellate Court in Hagen stated: "The State properly concedes that the prosecution was
required to prove jurisdiction, i.e., that defendant was not an Indian, albeit only by a
preponderance of evidence." The Hagen Court cited State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 469470, as authority for the proposition that the State had the burden of showing that a defendant
was not an Indian. However, the issue in Sorenson concerned territorial rather than personal
jurisdiction. While territorial jurisdiction must be proved by the State by a preponderance of
evidence in every criminal case (State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032) personal jurisdiction is not an
element of an offense and need not be proved as such. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has
not been consistent in requiring the State prove an individual is not an Indian. In an
unpublished opinion (State v. Lucero. Case No. 860213 - Ca) a different panel of the
Appellate Court held: "...Appellant had the burden to persuade the trial Court that he was an
'Indian' within the intended purview of 18 U.S.C. Section 1152-53." More importantly, our
Supreme Court has indicated: "On these facts, we conclude that Perank carried his burden of
factually establishing that he has been 'recognized racially' as a Ute Indian." Perank at 933.
Given the fact that the Perank decision is the most recent appellate decision and that it is die
opinion of our Supreme Court, this Court is bound to follow that decision. Therefore,
although the State bears the burden of showing that the offense occurred within the boundaries
of the State of Utah and Uintah County, the defendant has the burden to show, by a

2

Some have argued that Indian status, for the purposes of determining Federal jurisdiction
under Section 1152 and 1153 should be based entirely upon membership in a Federally
recognized Indian Tribe. This test would allow Indians to make their own determination of
"Indian" status. Reliance upon tribal membership would also provide an understandable and
workable standard. It would avoid consideration of such subjective and transitory issues as selfconcept as being Indian and recognition as being Indian within Indian Society. It further avoids
the quagmire encountered in making a determination of "Indian" status based upon Federal
recognition. Federal Statutes and Regulations which define "Indian" are inconsistent and
confusing. Individuals are defined as "Indian" for some purposes and programs, but are not
defined as "Indian" for other purposes and programs. Where an individual comes within some,
but not all, federal definitions, where does the Court draw the line in determining "Indian" status.
Is it sufficient if an individual meets at least one federal definition; or must he be recognized
within "most" definitions; or perhaps he must meet all federal definitions of "Indian". A
definition of "Indian" for the purpose of applying section 1152 which relies upon membership in
a Federally recognized Indian tribe provide a much more workable standard than the test set forth
in Hagen Nevertheless, most courts who have considered this issue have adopted the Hagen
test.
3

preponderance of evidence, that he is an "Indian" under the Rogers test.
Placing the burden on the defendant is consistent with what two Courts have
characterized as the majority position of courts which have addressed the issue. Arizona v.
Verdugo. 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1995 Ariz. App. Ct); Vermont v. St. Francis. 563 A.2d 249.
This is consistent with case law in: Arizona (Verdugo): Vermont (St. Francis): New Mexico
(State of New Mexico v. Cutnose. 532 P.2d 896, (N.M. App. 1974)); Nevada (State of
Nevada v. Jack. 96 P.497 (1908)); Pendleton v. Sate of Nevada 734 P.2d 693 (1987);
Oklahoma (State of Oklahoma v. Klindt. 782 P.2d 401, (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); Washington
(State of Washington v. Daniels. 16 P.3d 650) and with sound public policy, "...the general
rule is that the State has subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within its territorial
border. ...As an exception to that general rule, however, the Indian Country Crimes Act
preempts State Court jurisdiction over a criminal prosecution when an offense involving an
Indian occurs on Indian land...The federal statute is silent, however, on the issue of who bears
the burden of proof to establish these jurisdictional facts." Verdugo at 1167. The Arizona
Appellate Court then noted that while the State bears the burden to show the offense occurred
within State boundaries, the elements of a criminal offense do not require the State to prove
that the crime did not involve an Indian. The Court notes that to require the State to prove
that the defendant and the victim were not Indian would place ,f... the state... in a position of
having to prove the nonoccurence of events which might deprive it of jurisdiction." (Verdugo
at 1168). The court went on to note: "If we were to place this burden on the state, the state
would be compelled to allege...every conceivable exception to State Court jurisdiction."
(Verdugo at 1168). Not only would the state be required to allege every exception to
jurisdiction, the state would have the affirmative burden to prove that die exception did not
apply.
Wigmore suggest that in determining \yho should bear the burden of proof it is
appropriate to consider that it is difficult to prove the nonexistence of a fact and it is
appropriate to place the burden on the party who presumably has particular means of
knowledge.) Wigmore. Evidence in Trials at Common Law §2486 (1981). It is therefore
relevant that there are over three hundred Indian Tribes which have been recognized by the
Federal Government. Membership in any one of these tribes would be sufficient to meet the
second test as set forth in Rogers (i.e. that the individual has been recognized as an Indian by a
tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal Government). In addition to Federally
recognized tribes there are many more Indian groups or societies of Indians which may form
the basis to establish the second test in Rogers. It would therefore be virtually impossible for
the state to prove that a particular individual was not a member of any of the possible tribes
and Indian societies throughout the United States. Additionally, in many cases it would be
impossible to prove that a particular person did not have a significant degree of Indian blood
(which is the first test under Rogers). While it may be possible to determine the identity of a
defendant's parents it may be impossible to prove that the parents do not have Indian blood.
In the case of adopted persons, it would often be impossible to determine that the biological
parents were not Indian. This becomes even more difficult as you consider whether
4

grandparents and great grandparents (who may be deceased) have Indian blood. All of this is
complicated by the liberal interpretation courts have given to the term significant degree of
Indian blood. Generally twenty-five percent is considered substantial. It is obvious that, the
information which is relevant to a defendant's blood lines as well as his or her associations
with Indian Tribes and societies, is uniquely within the knowledge of the Defendant and is
usually readily available to the Defendant, while such information is often unavailable to the
State.
One must also remember that under 1151 the state is deprived of jurisdiction when a
victim is an Indian. If the state bears the burden of proof, the state must show that each victim
in every case is not an Indian. In most cases this could be easily accomplished by asking the
victim a few simple questions during trial. However, not all victims are available to be
examined at trial. Victims move and sometimes can not be located. Victims may die prior to
trial. By definition, a victim in a homicide would never be available to testify concerning their
blood lines or association with Indian Tribes and societies. Because Indian status may depend
on association with Indian tribes, culture, and society, it would often be difficult to prove that
a victim who is not present at trial was not an Indian. Occasionally, it is not possible for the
State to even identify the victim by name. (One of the cases cited above (Jack) involved a
victim of a homicide who was "commonly known by the name 'Lotta', whose real name was
to the grand jury unknown," (P 497). If the State were required to prove that it has
jurisdiction by disproving Indian status of each victim, there would be certain cases where the
victim's status as an non-Indian could never be proved. By placing the burden on the State,
this Court would be depriving the State of jurisdiction merely because the State has no access
to the kind of information necessary to prove Indian status under Rogers.
Considering all of the circumstances and public policy the burden is properly placed
upon the defendant to show an exception to state jurisdiction by establishing a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant or victim has a significant degree of Indian blood and has
been recognized as an Indian by an Indian Tribe, or society of Indians, or by the Federal
Government.
*
DATED this

J

day of ftme, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

ISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the.
.day of ./lyJrt/wN&N/^
2003, true and correct
copies of the Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Mr. Edwin T.
Peterson, Deputy Uintali County Attorney, at 152 E. 100 N., Vernal, UT 84078 and to Mr.
Michael L. Humiston, Attorney for Defendant, at 23 W. Center Street, P.O. Box 486, Heber
City, UT 84032.
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puty Clerk
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EDWIN T. PETERSON(#3849)
Deputy Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84075
Telephone: (435)781-5428

FILED
, DISTRICT COURT
'JfNTAH COUNTY, UTAH

JAN 2 9 2004
BY

-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Case No. 021800320
RICKIE L. REBER,
Judge A. Lynn Payne
Defendant.
The Court, having previously entered writtenfindingson this matter, adopts those
findings herein and makes further findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon the
stipulations of the parties as follows:

Defendant Rickie L. Reber is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton
destruction of protected wildlife", a third degree felony, for allegedly assisting his
son in taking a trophy buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area
known as the "Book Cliffs" in southern Uintah County. Mr. Reber initially
moved to dismiss the criminal charges claiming to be a member of the
"Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area the alleged act occurred was in
"Indian Country5. Mr. Reber, in the course of the litigation, abandoned his
claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is
a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either Shoshone or Ute decent.
Defendant Steven Paul Thunehorst is charged with "aiding or assisting in the
wanton destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area

known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern
Uintah County. Mr. Thunehorst initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Thunehorst, in the course
of the litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos
Tribe", affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of
either Shoshone or Ute decent.
3.

Defendant Tex William Atkins is charged with "aiding or assisting in the wanton
destruction of protected wildlife", a class "A" misdemeanor, for allegedly
assisting or taking a buck deer without the appropriate permit from the area
known as the "White Rocks Canyon" in the National Forest in Northwestern
Uintah County. Mr. Atkins initially moved to dismiss the criminal charges
claiming to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe" of Indians and that the area
the alleged act occurred was in "Indian Country'. Mr. Atkins, in the course of the
litigation, abandoned his claim to be a member of the "Timpanogos Tribe",
affirmatively alleging that he is a member of the "Uintah Band", and is of either
Shoshone or Ute decent.

4

With respect to Mr. Reber, it was stipulated by the parties that he claimed to be
l/16th Indian by blood, from his mother. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr.
Atkins it was stipulated by the parties that they claim to be 1/16th Indian by
blood, from their grandmother. Mr. Reber's mother, and the grandmother of Mr.
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were listed on the termination proclamation. Their
status as Indians was therefore terminated by the Ute Partition act of 1954, 25
U.S.C. sec 677 et seq. (Hereinafter the "UPA). Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins
may have a grandparent who had Indian blood but was not a member of a tribe
which was recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian
Affairs as an Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of
Indian affairs by virtue of their status as Indian tribe.
Mr. Thunehorst and Mr.
Atkins have not produced evidence of the heritage of this person.

5

Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins are not members of any Indian tribe
recognized by the United States Dept of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs as an
Indian entity, and eligible to receive services from the Bureau of Indian affairs by
virtue of their status as Indian tribe.

6

Mr. Reber is 51 years old, or was at the time of this Courts last ruling.

7

Mr. Reber was born in Roosevelt Utah and lived in Lapoint Utah until he was 22.

8

Mr. Reber has not lived on or near the Ute Indian Reservation since he was 22.

9

Mr. Reber does not now claim to be a member of the Timpanogos tribe.

10

Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins do not now maintain that the permit
that they produced when they were contacted by law enforcement was valid, but
do maintain that they believed that the permit was valid at that time of the alleged
violations.

11.

Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunehorst, and Mr. Atkins claim to be members of the "Uintah
Band", and that is the only group that they claim to be associated with.
They all maintain that they are Indians of Utah Territory. They do not claim to be
members of the Ute Indian Tribe, or of the Uintah band of the Ute Indian tribe
which is one of the three constituent bands which comprise the Ute Indian Tribe.

12.

Mr. Reber was alive in 1961. Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins were born after
1961, however Mr. Thunehorst's and Mr. Atkin's mothers, who were sisters, were
alive at the time of the termination proclamation in 1961.

The Court makes the following conclusions of law.
With respect to Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, even if the court were to not
consider the issue of the UP A, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 etseq., they do not have significant blood
quantum under the first prong of the two part analysis stated in United States v. Rogers. 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846), which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in State v Perank,
858 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) to be considered an Indian. The Court can find no benefit which
is available base upon Indian blood quantum of 1/16th. Therefore for the purpose of qualifying
for Federal programs or recognition they do not qualify based upon their quantum of blood.
When describing a person as having 1/16 Indian Blood one must realize that necessarily means
that same person is 15/16 non Indian. That means that he has 6 1/4% Indian blood and
93 3/4 non Indian blood. This percentage of blood is simply not high enough to meet the first
prong of the Rogers Test. The Court has found no Federal or State case which determined a
percentage of Indian blood as low as 6.25 % to be significant under the Rogers Test. There is
judicial precedence, Vialpando vs Wyoming. 640 P.2d 77, that 12 Vi % was not substantial
under the Rogers Test. Other case have held that 12 Vi % is substantial. This Court is unaware
of any case which has gone below 12 l/2 %. The case that held 12 Vi % was substantial is Sully
ys. United States 195 Fed. 2d. 113 which was issued by the 8th Circuit and is an old case.
Even if Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkin's blood quantum was of a significant
amount, the Court finds that the UPA terminated their status as an Indian for the purpose of
criminal jurisdiction. Congress has the plenary power to legislate for Indian tribes in all matters.
An individuals status as Indian for jurisdictional purposes is subject to the power of Congress to
allocate jurisdiction between the State, Tribes, and the Federal Government. Congress clearly has
the unilateral power to grant the State jurisdictions over persons who are Indian.. The statute in
this case (Ute Partition Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 677 et seq.) says that upon termination, all statutes of
the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be
applicable to such member over which supervision was terminated and the laws of the several
States shall apply to such member in the same manner as they apply to other citizens within their
jurisdiction. That provision clearly grants to the State jurisdiction over all persons who are listed
in the termination proclamation which would include Mr. Reber's mother and Mr. Thunhorst and

Mr. Atkins5 grandmother. Therefore, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, Mr. Reber's
Mother and Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother are no longer considered to be Indian.
The natural consequence of termination of these ancestors as Indian is that each of the
Defendant's would not be considered to have received any Indian blood from, in Mr. Reber's
case, his mother and in Mr Atkins and Mr. Thunhorst case, their grandmother.
The Court does not believe that Congress intended to terminate an ancestors status as
Indian only to continue that relationship with their decedents.
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction under Rogers Mr. Reber, does not have any
Indian blood coming through his mother and since this is the only Indian blood which he claims,
he does not have any Indian blood for the purposes of the Rogers analysis. As for Mr. Thunhorst
and Mr. Atkins they also have no Indian blood coming from their maternal grandmother. The
conclusion of this Court is based upon the conclusions of the Federal Court in the Felter case.
U.S. vOrranaB. Felter. 546 F.Supp. 1002 (D.C. 1982), affd752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir 1985) and
the Utah Appellate Court in the Gardner case State v. Gardner. 827 P. 2d 980 (Utah App.
1992)..
Mr. Reber, Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins argue that in spite of the termination of their
ancestors Indian status, they have not been affected by the UPA; because in Mr. Rebers case he,
and in Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' case their mother was alive at the time of the UPA. The
absence of the Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins' mother's name, or in Mr. Rebers case his name
on the termination proclamation is not relevant to this inquiry. It only reflects that at the time of
the termination act, Mr. Reber and the mothers of Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins, were not
enrolled members of the Ute Tribe, and therefore could not be an individual who could receive
tribal benefits. Because these individuals were not tribal members they could not have been
listed on the termination proclamation. Nevertheless, their immediate ancestors were members
of the tribe whose Indian Status was terminated.
It is clear to the Court that by 1950 all relevant Indian hunting and fishing rights were
vested in the Ute Indian tribe. No individual had a right to those hunting and fishing rights
except through the tribe, and through membership in the tribe. Again it is evident to the Court
that Congress did not intend to terminate Mr. Reber's mothers status as and Indian and Mr.
Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins grandmother's status as an Indian, only to recognize their children and
grandchildren to have Indian hunting rights based upon Indian heritage which was
Congressionally terminated. The argument that they were not among the 490 individuals listed in
the UPA is therefore without merit. One is either a member or not. Whether or not they were
eligible to be an individual who was entitled to membership is not the issue. Before this Court
can take note of any privilege which is based upon tribal membership, that person must apply for
and be granted membership by the tribe. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Reber, Mr.
Thunhorst or Mr. Atkins have ever applied for or been granted membership by the Ute Indian
Tribe. And there is no indication that Mr. Thunhorst, Mr. Reber or Mr. Atkins has been granted
any other tribal membership.
It would be inappropriate for the Court to extend any privilege which is available only
through membership when the tribe has never granted those privileges through membership.
Even if a Defendant may have once been eligible for membership that would not be relevant
You either are a tribal member or you're not. If you are eligible you need to apply and be granted
those privileges. The Court was further convinced after reading Judge Jenkins opinion in Felter
which was the basis for the Murdoch decision, U.Sv. Murdoch. 132 F.3d 534 (10th Cir 1997),

that there is a connection. The Court finds that all of those rights are vested in the Tribe. A
members interest in that tribal property is personal and cannot be transferred or inherited. It is
true that those 490 persons who were terminated under the UPA continue to have hunting and
fishing rights it is not true that their heirs would continue to claim any interest in tribal property
in their own right if they were not given the privileges of tribal membership. The rights of the
terminated Utes to hunt and fish was not their personal property right and would be extinguished
with their death and is not transferable or inheritable. The children of persons listed on the
Termination Proclamation are not entitled through their parents to enjoy hunting and fishing
privileges. There was a foot note I think from the Murdoch case, citing Judge Jenkins opinion in
the Felter case, and I'm going to paraphrase that. In essence he said, those who are terminated
Utes are readily identified and that their rights can be ascertained and that attrition would
eventually extinguish the rights that they have because those rights are not inheritable or
transferable and ultimately those rights would end.
The Court finds that Mr Reber does not have, independent of the Termination Act,
sufficient blood quantum to qualify for an Indian under the Rogers Test. I believe for purposes
considering the Termination Act considering the Rogers Test he has no Indian blood. Mr. Reber
does not and can not have any hunting or fishing rights that come through his mother, because
they have been terminated and they are not transferable even though he was alive at the time of
the Termination Act. Mr. Reber rights must be connected to the tribe who were the ones who
had the hunting and fishing rights. With respect to Mr. Thunhorst and Mr. Atkins the Court
will not consider, for purpose of analysis, the Indian blood coming through their Maternal
Grandmother. The same analysis will apply with respect to whether or not they receive any
hunting or fishing rights from their Maternal Grandmother. Because the Court has found that no
Defendant has sufficient blood quantum to satisfy the first prong of the Rodgers decision the
Court need not inquire as to the second.
All Motions with respect to claims that the Court does not have jurisdiction which are
based upon claims that the defendants are Indians are denied. The Court has jurisdiction to hear
the criminal cases which have been filed.

Dated this 3 7 day of

3 ^^^^2004

BY THE COURT:

A. Lynn Paynep
Eighth District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I do hereby certify that I delivered by US Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MODIFIED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Michael L.
Humiston Attorney for Defendant, 23 West Center Street P.O. Box 486 Heber City, Utah 84032,
on this ~Z?^ day of January, 2004.

